Cloudscape

On the hypothesis of a dualistic universe, in which there is both mind and matter.

According to multiverse theory, our own universe is but one of many, and the totality of universes is infinite. While perhaps counterintuitive, it is most logical for the universe to be infinite because there should otherwise be something to impose limitations upon it. Suppose, for instance, that there is only a certain and constant amount of energy in the Universe, then something must have somehow determined this amount: since there is nothing outside of the Universe, however, this is impossible. Other objections are raised in the article "Modal Realism" and The Infinity Principle."

If the universe is infinite, this means that anything that is possible at all will happen (see entry Modal Realism) because any probability, being dependant on time and space, will become 100% if time and space become infinite. This effectively means that any universe one can think of is real: and if we think of these universes, in our minds we are partly inside it.

This also means that there are an infinite number of universes identical or almost identical to our own, and that every moment infinitely many of those will diverge (while another infinitely many of them will still remain identical). Infinitely many of these universes will each have a different destiny: in one of them, you died a second ago, in another you a celebrity, in one you decided to travel around the world, in one you survived an earthquake with a broken neck, in another woke up to find yourself inexplicably in alien surroundings, in another you were brought to the mental hospital for acute psychosis, and in yet another you are reading this text. According to the many-worlds principle, this is an explanation for quantum chaos.

Now here is the paradox: if there is an infinite number of identical universes, what determines in which of these universes we end up?

After all, if consciousness is caused by matter, there are only two possibilities: either it is caused by the quality or quantity of matter. The former means that consciousness is caused by patterns, that is, the arrangement of particles; therefore, consciousness lies in information. The latter means that consciousness is caused by energy itself, that is, it is in the particles themselves; therefore, consciousness lies within matter.

Actually, these two possibilities are but two variations of the same, as even energy is but information: if our consciousness lies in the particles that compose us, after all, this basically means that it lies in the information of which particle or particles is us. Even this would be a pattern, since it would be an association between consciousness and particles.

In the latter case, however, our lives would be very short, as the particles our brain comprises are replaced every so often, upon which other particles would take their place and live our lives in our stead. Our lives would be so short, in fact, that is would be improbably at any given time that we would be alive, since the vast majority of the matter in the universe is, after all, unconscious.

However, eventually our particles or particle would once more become part of another brain, and we could, in principle, be alive again - if the theory that matter causes consciousness in this way is true. However, this "dormant" phase between two lives could appear to pass instantaneously because we would not be conscious at all, much as like sleep: even if it would last billions of years before our particles would become part of another brain, it would appear to take no time at all. On the other hand, since our consciousness would last for such a short time it would remain extremely improbable that we'd happen to be human at any given time, as the majority of conscious creatures are still much smaller and therefore more numerous than ourselves, even if their consciousness is only very limited.

If consciousness would bound to a single elementary particle, however, this statistic improbability would largely fall away because there are far more elementary particles in a human brain than in an animal brain. However, this hypothesis comes to seem quite illogical when one takes into consideration that this one elementary particle, while having no real connection with the other particles of the brain it is part of, would be conscious of the thoughts of the entire brain.

So there should be a connection between the particles with each other in order for them to be conscious of each other, that is, to form one single consciousness. Now the crucial thing is that this connection between this particles is in itself is a pattern.

Thus, in order for particles to form any consciousness at all, there would have to be pattern in them. Patterns in mind can only be brought about if there are patterns in matter -- at least, if and only if the mind is produced by matter.

It appears, then, that like many other hypotheses we have explored, the hypothesis that consciousness is caused by energy meets a dead end, as it clearly seems to clash with logic. That leaves the theory that consciousness resides within the patterns of energy - a theory coined "patternism" by Raymond Kurzweil.

There are, however, a few problems with this theory, as well, even though it is the most plausible dualist theory (involving both mind and matter). One of these is the translation of material into mental patterns. How does this translation happen? What performs this translation? How can something objective turn into something subjective?

After all, in a material world causality occurs outside of the ideal world. Yet somehow, the material world should cause the ideal world to arise. Thus ideality is somehow involved in a causal process even though it is not part of the material world. This is obviously a paradox.

Everything must have an explanation: this is the base of logic, and if there is no logic in the universe then I am just wasting my time here trying to find one. But this also means that there must be an explanation for what causes consciousness, and if consciousness is caused by matter, then there must be an explanation for how matter causes consciousness, that is, in what way. There must be a mechanism through which a particular configuration of nervous impulses produces a particular configuration of qualia, just like there is a mechanism through which a particular code of DNA produces a particular configuration of amino acids into protein. And yet, this mechanism itself would be part of the material, causal world.

Should there be any reason at all why one configuration of energy should lead to one configuration of consciousness and another to another? How is it that one brain thinks of what it's going to do tonight and another, say, about the nature of consciousness? Why should a brain be more conscious than a computer, or even a vat of chemicals? In everything in the material world, there is a logical explanation why one thing leads to another, but this does not seem to apply for consciousness. I say this not because I cannot find an answer, but because it seems illogical that there could be an answer at all. Somehow, consciousness and matter seem irreconcilable.

Clearly, it's not enough for there to be a chemical reaction in the brain for it to produce consciousness, as we are unconscious of many of those chemical reactions. Our memories are comprised of such chemical reactions too, after all, and yet we're not conscious of them all the time. So in what part of our brain is our consciousness?

Should there be any reason at all why one configuration of energy should lead to one configuration of consciousness and another to another? How is it that one brain thinks of what it's going to do tonight and another, say, about the nature of consciousness? Why should a brain be more conscious than a computer, or even a vat of chemicals? In everything in the material world, there is a logical explanation why one thing leads to another, but this does not seem to apply for consciousness. I say this not because I cannot find an answer, but because it seems illogical that there could be an answer at all. Somehow, consciousness and matter seem irreconcilable.

To put it more intuitively, think of it in the following way: no matter what scientists will ever do, it is per definition impossible to find out what makes us conscious. Hypothetically, we could use humans as test subjects, cause changes in their neurochemistry and ask them how they experience them -- but we can never find out why these changes cause these experiences. We'll still discover a lot about how our neurochemistry works, but never about how the transition to actual consciousness happens because that is impossible. We can know how consciousness works, in a way, which is what neurology and psychology are about, but we can never know why consciousness exists, which is what philosophy is about.

Neurology could go on and on in looking for an explanation for consciousness, but it's a quest that would never end. Our first attempt in doing so was in our discovery that thought is produced by the brain. The inevitable question arose, then, how the brain produces consciousness. We then discovered that the brain is made of a web of nerves, and that the signals they transfer within produce consciousness. This, in turn, only raised the question how these signals produced consciousness, and so on. Some neurologists are starting to suspect quantum effects play part in the whole process. In the end, the question will keep following us throughout the advance of science, ever going deeper and deeper into its realms, becoming increasingly abstract as it does, all the way down to quantum physics and beyond!

But doesn't it strike you that the question remained the same throughout history? It's been posed in increasingly complicated variations of the theme "What causes consciousness?" but it's always basically remained the same question. Attributing consciousness to chemical reactions in our brain isn't any more of an answer to that question than attributing it to things that happen in the world around us. If you come to think of it, there is no difference with regards to the question of consciousness: both the things that happen in our environment and the things that happen in our brain must be subject to an interpretation, that is to say, something that translates it into consciousness. If this event is just chemical reaction in the brain or a change in our environment doesn't matter.

So we can either choose to avoid the question unto infinity through scientific method ("the cause is caused by a cause which is caused by a cause which is caused by a cause" and so forth ad infinitum) or treat the question as it is supposed to be, philosophically.

Plain logic seems to show us that there is no way out here. Something objective cannot become subjective because subjectivity and objectivity cannot be reconciled. Whatever objective reality there would be would have to be perceived in a subjective reality; this means that subjective reality always stand above objective reality, looking upon it, and can therefore not be part of it. What this means is that consciousness is something greater than matter and cannot be caused by it.

These objections left aside, there is another problem with patternism. Many futurists, including Raymond Kurzweil, argue that we might in future somehow be able to transfer our consciousness form our brain to an electronic brain. And this is where the metaphysical confusion about consciousness really becomes evident (see entry Consciousness, the Greatest Mystery of the Universe).

It's baffled every futurist who believed in it how such "uploading" could be performed. Suppose that one would build a computer which contains all the information in your brain and kill you at the moment one deactivated it? Or that one would just gradually replace your neurons one by one with nanoscale computers which would connect to your own brain, until every neuron in your brain would be replaced?

The answer to the last questions seems more intuitive, but this is misleading. An analogous example shows that it is not at all as obvious as it seems. Suppose that the process would occur in another way: instead of having your neurons gradually replaced by nanocomputers inside of your brain, the nanocomputers would instead remain outside of your body, connected not through direct contact but via nanorobots in your brain which would transfer the information at light speed. Eventually, every of your neurons would be replaced and the last nanorobots in your now empty skull would shut down. Meanwhile, all information that was once part of your brain would now be transferred to a computer or network somewhere else. All the while you were conscious of this information as it was steadily transferred into your new brain. The only difference between this and the former scenario is the physical distance between the brain and the nanocomputers.

There are many other objections here which make the principle uploading seem all the more mysterious. Suppose there were a slight delay in the transference of information from the neurons to the nanocomputers as the latter replaced the former, for instance, how long could this delay be before it would be too late and the brain would no longer be conscious of the information stored in the nanocomputers? Suppose the information were just slightly different, how different could it be? And most important of all, if the brain and the nanocomputers would keep communicating throughout the process of replacement, so that the brain would remain conscious of the nanocomputers' information, at which point would the consciousness be transfered to the nanocomputers? If the nanocomputers and the brain would disconnect when the replacement process is halfway, would the consciousness somehow have half transfered and the individual be conscious both of the information in the brain and in the nanocomputers? Could one dispense with what is left of the brain safely at this point, and assume that the consciousness had already transfered to the nanocomputers anyway?

You might say computers would be unable either how to produce consciousness. Well, then, let's instead use a brain in our hypothesis. Suppose a mad scientist stole your brain and put it in a vat; in another vat, there is another brain which is exactly the same down to subatomic level. Admittedly, this is practically impossible, but since it is still theoretically possible, let us just assume it to be so. This second brain contains exactly the same information as your own: it has exactly the same neural circuitry with all the same nervous impulses. If consciousness is indeed caused by patterns, then in principle at this point you should be both brains at the same time because there is no difference between the two, much like a quantum particle can be at two places at the same time. What happens to your consciousness, then, when the two brains stop being identical, for instance randomly, or just because the mad scientist decided to destroy your original brain?

As a better example, let's say there are three identical brains, one being your original brain. If your consciousness would cease, this would apparently mean that it is bound to the particles of your brain, which we have already explained seems to be impossible. If your consciousness would be transferred, then consciousness is indeed bound to patterns. But now you see why I've put in three brains: there is still the question which brain you'd be transferred into.

If a second of the three brains was destroyed, would you still be alive?

One may be inclined to say this would be mere coincidence, and I know that there is little I can say against such final argument. After all, it does seem to be coincidental that we ended up to be us when we were born, but that can also be said about the fact that today as I am writing this is the fifth of October. This is no allusion to reincarnation, but with this I mean to say that it is coincidental that that which is, is. That we are now instead of sometime in the past or future is a coincidence, and so, as a result is where we are; and, since our body can be interpreted as a place, so in a way is who we are

However, this is only so for that which already is in the here and now as independent of the past and future; the relation between now, past and future cannot be coincidental. In other words, while both the occurrence of a cause and the occurrence of a consequence are coincidental, the relation between cause and consequence can not be coincidental. Put in a plainer way, causality cannot be coincidental because in that case it would be no causality at all. Causality is the opposite of coincidence. If something is "coincidental," it means it has no reason in particular for being what it is rather than something else. Upon a closer look, however, the underlying system which caused it was not in itself coincidental, and only nonspecific cases can have several outcomes.

Even quantum chaos is only the appearance of coincidence caused by its unpredictability, a more complicated variant of classical chaos theory, famously formulated with the example that a butterfly can cause a hurricane by beating its wings. However, to predict the behavior of a quantum system we would have to know both the position and speed of every particle it contains, and since the Heisenberg principle makes this impossible to us, it is also impossible to observe any predictability there might be in a quantum system; since it cannot be observed, it is irrelevant to us. The same approach is used in the Planck length: since it is impossible to us to observe a distance smallest than the Planck length, it is meaningless to us and we say that "the Planck length is the smallest distance in the universe."

Only if something has no particular cause except for chaos do we say that it is coincidental. Or the other way around, for something to be coincidental it must have no cause except for chaos.

We could assume that this is the case for consciousness, but we already stated that if consciousness is caused by the material world it must be caused by patterns. However, if consciousness were random. Again, we could then state that, since our consciousness would every moment switch to another entity, it would be extremely unlikely for us to be human at any given moment: the average "me" would be an insect.

Thus, finally even patternism appears to meet a dead end, that is, unless one resorts to acausality. If one attributes consciousness to coincidence, however, one may as well stop thinking about it altogether, as doing so one is dispensing with all logic. As said before, logic is to search for a relation between cause and consequence, and if one affirms that there is no cause at all for something, then one is no longer dealing with logic.

With regards to our brain replica hypothesis, the only thing one could object as far as I can see is that the location of the brain would be a piece of information which is included in the patterns which comprise our mind. This issue is quickly resolved, however, as the mad scientist could simply exchange one brain for the other. One could then argue that it is the continuity in the location of the brain which plays a role: that is, that consciousness can't "teleport" from one location to another, and therefore neither from one brain to another.

I admit it seems a far-fetched argument, but I want to explore every possible hypothesis to explore their probability. Another similar, ostensibly less far-fetched argument is that rather than the continuity of space, it is the continuity of time which determines who we are.

After all, like the matter it is made of, the patterns of our mind change continuously, so that it would appear that the theory that our consciousness is determined by patterns is incomplete. Raymond Kurzweil argues, however, that it is the continuity of our brain patterns which makes us conscious, which is an important nuance. This may be compared to a chronometer session: as long as the session goes, it's still the same session; when a new session is started, it's still a session on the same chronometer and going at the same speed, but it's no longer the same session. Basically, this continuity argument ascribes who we are now to who we used to be in the past.

Still, I have an objection against both arguments - both the argument of space continuity and the argument of time continuity - which I will explain in the following thought experiment.

Suppose that every neuron in our brain were engineered to regain their possibility of mitosis, that is, cell division (most brain cells normally do not divide), and that every neuron divided at once. Imagine that once they have divided, all neurons would have the same connections the neurons of the original brain had. Basically, you'd have two brains intertwined in each other, because each of the neurons of the original brain split up and remained connected. Now imagine that these two brains would somehow be separated.

Like the previous hypothesis, this is practically impossible because neurons are mechanically interlocked into a complex skein, but theoretically, it certainly is possible, so that for the sake of argument we assume it is possible. We could assume that, while the neurons are separated from each other into two separate brains, their membranes could somehow temporarily coalesce and then separate again as they collide with each other during their separation, so that they would go through each other as if they never were there.

Or, we could just assume that although the two brains are intertwined, they function separately from each other because there is no connection between their neurons anyway. Or we could simplify the hypothesis by using a single neuron instead of a whole brain, and assume that this one neuron had a limited but existant consciousness, and suppose that it would split up.

The idea, either how, is that a system which gives rise to consciousness is split in two. We have thus created a hypothesis in which everything about the two brains is initially exactly the same: the two brains came from a single brain and therefore once shared the same energy, the same location, and share the same patterns; they even share the same history, which decisively deals with the continuity argument as well. They are as identical as anything can be, with the exception that they are made of different energies. This is the ultimate thought experiment in our attempts to find an answer to the question: what is consciousness?

There are only two objections which can still be made to this thought experiment, and they have both been discussed above: one is that consciousness is bound to a single elementary particle, and the other that the transfer of consciousness would be coincidental. Both to me seem to clash with logic, as I have already explained above. I believe, however, that most people will like to dismiss my thought experiments by attributing mind transfer to coincidence because it the most convenient solution. Nonetheless, whatever the solution may be, I think it must be more sophisticated than that.

It seems to me a rather tempting supposition, however, that all causality must have its origin within our own minds because there could otherwise (if all or some causality had its origin without our minds), there could be no causality explaining why two separate yet otherwise fully identical minds could diverge into different brains, since, in this case, one mind could become transferred in either of several directions, without any cause explaining which of the them it should be, or why it is any of them rather than another; therefore, the mind cannot have any cause in anything external to it, and therefore, neither can anything whatsoever in all life.

We come to the conclusion that in order for causality to hold, two minds that are exactly identical should evolve in exactly the same direction, being the sole possible direction, since, if they do not, then which of several possible directions any of these minds takes is acausal. (Note that with minds that are "identical," I mean identical in every possible way, including location, as would be the case in the brain-splitting hypothesis.) However, if there is only one possible direction in which a mind can go, then it cannot, ultimately, depend on external factors, because if it did, it could in fact go in several possible directions, as illustrated in the mad scientist hypothesis: for instance, one of them could be destroyed by an external factor (the mad scientist himself).

All causality in our lives must come from within our own minds, because otherwise, there could be no causality explaining why two separate yet identical minds could diverge, since, in this case, one consciousness could have become transferred in either of two directions without any cause explaining which direction was taken.

This is so because in a material universe, as in the aforementioned thought experiment, two minds could in theory (though hardly in practice) be identical to each other, independent from external conditions. However, the external conditions might be or become different (for instance, when one of the twin minds becomes destroyed): if the external conditions become different, however, the identical minds diverge, cease to be identical, and therefore, take different directions; which mind takes which direction could, in this case, have no explanation at all, so that we reach a logical paradox which can apparently not be resolved.

Thus, since it seems impossible that the mind is caused by matter, perhaps it must be the other way around, and matter, or what appears to be matter, is caused by the mind; more properly put, in fact, one could say it is part of the mind, much like a dream. This follows because if matter were not part of the mind, it could not be perceived by the mind since in our line of reasoning matter cannot affect the mind.

I mentioned earlier that there can be only one direction in which a mind can go, since identical minds could otherwise diverge without reason and, therefore, without cause. This sounds like a deterministic viewpoint, and in a way, it is, but I do not think this matters much with regards to free will: it merely means that our free will itself is deterministic, not that it does not exist. How one views this is a mere matter of perception: the view that determinism would deny free will is more an emotional judgment than a rational one, since determinism would not change anything about our free will as such, only about its cause.

The thought experiments I've just expounded are very similar to the issue we've touched upon earlier when we were talking about the many-worlds principle. After all, if our consciousness is determined by patterns in our brain then mind transfer should occur should we die: there's an infinity of copies of ourself out there in an infinite universe, so we'd have an infinite number of possible universes to go to, which you'll agree sounds bizarre. In fact, with an infinite number of possible universes, none would be more probable than the other because every chance would be equal to infinity by infinity, ie undefined. This would mean that all probabilities would be equal, and so reality would basically cease to exist.

Again, we face the issue: what determines in which universe "I" end up if there are an infinite number of me's? Some would object that the universe must be finite, and therefore this issue is irrelevant, but even if the universe is finite, this issue is in effect not irrelevant, because of the mere theoretical possibility of the coexistence of two fully identical minds. Merely because something is not going to happen does not mean that it could not. One cannot affirm that the laws of the universe remain perfectly logical only as long as certain events do not occur; whether they will occur or not, the laws of the universe should hold under all possibilities, even purely hypothetical ones.

If the mind is limited to the brain, then two identical consciousnesses in two identical brains could randomly split up without any causation at all when they undergo a different fate, which is a logical impossibility. However, if one's entire life is included in one's mind, as a dream would be, then identical consciousnesses could never split up as anything that happens to them has an internal causation, and therefore, two identical consciousnesses would always have the same fate.

I must apologize for the difficulties it takes me to explain such a highly convoluted matter, and for the consequent difficulties it takes to understand it. I assure you it has nothing to do with you. I have myself often found it hard to follow my own reasonings in this matter. However, we have passed the worst point, and the following part will be more straightforward.

Part two: A Monistic Universe?

See also:

Law of Attraction

The Innerverse

Modal Realism

Consciousness, the Greatest Mystery of the Universe

The God Theory - Part I, Analytical

The God Theory - Part II, Holistic

The infinity Principle

The Meaning of I

The God Theory - Part II, Holistic

The infinity Principle

The Meaning of I